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ABSTRACT 
To accommodate the nation’s escalating demand for natural gas, which is 
expected to increase 700% by 2030, the natural gas industry will likely build several new 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals.  The location of these new terminals is an 
important strategic decision that significantly impacts the resiliency of the nation’s 
natural gas supply and distribution network.  Due to public opposition in many 
communities and shortcomings in the current licensing process, any additional LNG 
import terminals are apt to be concentrated along the Gulf Coast.  Unfortunately, this 
impending concentration will increase the vulnerability and diminish the resiliency of this 
critical infrastructure.   
This thesis uses network theory to forecast how the location of new terminals will 
impact the risk, vulnerability, and resiliency of the natural gas supply and distribution 
network.  To enhance the resiliency and reduce the vulnerability of this critical 
infrastructure, we argue network analysis methodology should be applied during the 
terminal siting process.  The Federal government must act quickly to facilitate siting of 
terminals in locations that reduce the vulnerability and improve the resiliency of the 
natural gas network.  Failure to act will squander an unprecedented opportunity to shape 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
“As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, infrastructure failure, regardless of 
cause, can exponentially amplify otherwise difficult but manageable 
consequences.” 
- William Webster, Acting Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council1 
 
A. PROBLEM 
To meet the nation’s demand for natural gas, imports of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) are expected to increase more than 700% by 2030.2  In response to this 
remarkable increase in demand, the natural gas industry will build several new import 
terminals to significantly expand the nation’s LNG import capacity.  For sound economic 
reasons, the natural gas industry is eager to construct new LNG import terminals in 
regions with the greatest demand, such as California and New England.  However, much 
of the public perceives these terminals and the ships that service them as precariously 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks and an unacceptable hazard to the surrounding community.  
Because stiff local opposition can successfully derail efforts to site a facility, additional 
import terminals are apt to be concentrated along the relatively “LNG-friendly” Gulf 
Coast. 
The natural gas supply and distribution network is comprised of the LNG import 
terminals, storage facilities, and interstate pipelines that connect them and deliver the 
natural gas to markets.  This network is critical infrastructure in the energy sector.  
Though the siting of new LNG import terminals critically impacts the risk, vulnerability, 
and resiliency of the country’s natural gas supply and distribution network, their affect on 
the network is not evaluated by the Federal government during the siting review and 
licensing process. 
                                                 
1 Letter to Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, dated February 14, 2006. 
2 Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2006,” February 2006, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo06/index.html> (Accessed 23 September 2006). 
2 
As demonstrated by the devastating hurricanes that struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, 
the entire country assumes great liability if the oil and gas infrastructure continues to be 
concentrated in any one geographic area of the country.  In addition to the vulnerabilities 
generated by this practice, the additional costs necessary to transport the natural gas from 
the Gulf to markets in the Northeast and West could cost billions of extra dollars.3   
The impending expansion and alteration of the natural gas infrastructure provide 
an unprecedented opportunity to diversify the nation’s energy supply and improve the 
resiliency of this important network.  The siting decisions made today will significantly 
impact U.S. national security interests and economic stability for decades to come.  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary questions investigated by this research are: 
(1) Can network theory be used to predict what impact any given proposed LNG 
import terminal will have on the risk, vulnerability, and resiliency of the nation’s natural 
gas supply and distribution network?   
(2) Is it possible to predict how geographic concentration of new LNG import 
terminals will affect the network’s risk, vulnerability, and resiliency? 
(3) If network theory is capable of forecasting how proposed LNG import 
terminals will affect the future health of the natural gas supply and distribution network, 
how should these predictions be applied during the siting process?  
    
C. METHODOLOGY 
The existing natural gas supply and distribution system that services the Eastern 
half of the U.S. will be modeled using readily available data from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).   
                                                 
3 Paul Parfomak, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in U.S. Energy Policy: Infrastructure and Market 
Issues, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), 1. 
 
3 
Given all of the newly proposed and approved LNG import terminals, three 
possible growth scenarios are considered and, in each case, the resulting network is 
evaluated.  One variation of the network includes all thirty nine of the approved or 
proposed LNG import terminals.  Since experts doubt all of the approved or proposed 
terminals will be built, the other two variations include only eight of the approved or 
proposed LNG import terminals.  One of the variations disperses the facilities throughout 
the network and the other configuration concentrates them along the Gulf coast.  
Software developed by Lewis4 is used to analyze each of the three network 
variations.  These network analyses identify the critical components and determine the 
relative cost necessary to reduce vulnerability and risk and guarantee a certain quantity of 
natural gas flow.  The resiliency of the dispersed and concentrated networks is assessed 
by evaluating how each network performs when individual network components are 
damaged.  Analyses of the concentrated and dispersed networks are compared to 
illustrate the impact of geographically concentrating network components.   
Lastly, the role and responsibility of the primary federal agencies involved in 
LNG import terminal siting and licensing are evaluated to identify methods to incorporate 
network assessment methodology into the siting evaluation process.  
                                                 
4 Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation 
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5 
II. LNG IN THE U.S. 
“…without more infrastructure, gas may face the kind of glut plaguing the 
electric utility industry, with too much generating capacity and too few 
connections.” 
– anonymous quote from member of natural gas industry5  
 
A. LNG FUNDAMENTALS 
Natural gas is an odorless, colorless, and non-toxic gas at ambient temperature.  It 
is predominantly composed of methane (CH4), but it includes varying amounts of other 
hydrocarbon gases, including ethane, propane, butane, and pentane.  In addition, it will 
also contain various amounts of water, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, nitrogen, and 
other contaminants.  
If cooled to - 260°F, natural gas condenses into a liquid and becomes liquefied 
natural gas, or as it is more commonly known, “LNG.”  It is a clear liquid that is less 
dense than water.  Though the extremely cold temperature of the liquid requires special 
materials and procedures for storing and handling, the volume occupied by the natural 
gas is reduced 600 times when it is condensed into LNG.  Consequently, the space 
needed to store LNG is only 1/600th the volume required to store the “equivalent” amount 
of natural gas.  In the event of a leak, LNG quickly vaporizes into a gas, rises into the air, 
and forms a cloud.6 
Though it is too costly to ship in the gas phase, transport of LNG in specially 
designed vessels can be economical, despite the significant investment in infrastructure 
that is necessary in order to properly handle and store the cargo.  Historically, ships have 
been chartered and operated on a regular schedule between a specific gas field and an 
associated LNG terminal for as long as twenty five years. The marine terminal exporting 
the gas has a liquefaction plant that condenses the natural gas into LNG and loads it 
aboard the ship, which then transports it to a terminal in the U.S. where it is offloaded 
                                                 
5 Parformak, Liquefied Natural Gas, 13. 
6 Alain Vaudolon, Liquefied Gases Marine Transportation and Storage (London: Witherby & 
Company Limited, 2000), 7. 
6 
and stored in tanks.  In response to demand, the LNG is regasified and delivered into the 
pipeline network.  
In 1959, the METHANE PIONEER, a converted WWII dry cargo vessel, became 
the first ship in the world to transport LNG.  The vessel successfully carried 5,000 m3 of 
LNG from Lake Charles, Louisiana to the United Kingdom.  In 1964, the first vessels 
purposely built to carry LNG were delivered.  Each had a capacity of 27,400 m3 and 
operated safely for many years.  Similarly, the 25,550 m3 JULES VERNE was built in 
1965 and, in 2000, was reportedly still carrying LNG from Algeria to Spain, representing 
thirty four years of service and nearly 1,200 voyages.7   
 
Figure 1.   Typical LNG Tank Ship (From FERC <http://www.ferc.gov/press-
room/photo-gallery/photo-gallery-lng.asp>) 
The size of LNG ships increased quickly, growing to 125,000 m3 by the middle of 
the 1970s.  The average LNG ship in service today can carry approximately 138,000 m3 
of cargo.  Surprisingly, the LNG is not refrigerated or stored under pressure while aboard 
the ship.  The tanks have maximum operating pressure of only approximately one or two 
psia and insulate the LNG from the warmer ambient temperature surrounding the tank.   
In 2000, there were only 117 LNG ships trading around the world.  By January of 
2007, there were an additional 134 new LNG tank ships either under construction or on 
order.8   
                                                 
7 Vaudolon, Liquefied Gases, 22. 
8 Maritime Business Strategies, The Orderbook of LNG Carriers (as of January 1, 2007), 
<http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/worldsbldg/gas/lngorderbook.htm> (Accessed 8 January 2007). 
7 
 
Figure 2.   Cargo Tanks Installed in New LNG Tank Ship (From Sandia National 
Laboratories, Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large LNG 
Spill Over Water). 
 
B. INCREASING DEMAND 
As shown in Figure 3, imports of LNG into the United States have grown 
dramatically over the past ten years.9  In 2004, a record-high 650 billion cubic feet (Bcf) 
of LNG was imported from seven different countries, amounting to a 30% increase from 
2003.  In 2005, the EIA estimated the annual U.S. LNG demand would grow to 6,400 Bcf 
cubic feet by 2025.10  Though current predictions for the LNG demand have fallen from 
previous estimates, the most recent predictions still estimate annual LNG imports to 
increase 733% to 4,400 Bcf by 2030.11  
 
 
                                                 
9 Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Navigator, 
<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9103us2A.htm> (Accessed 22 April 2006). 
10 Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2005,” February 2005, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo05/index.html> (Accessed 8 January 2007). 
11 Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2006,” February 2006, 




Figure 3.   Predicted Annual LNG Imports in Trillions of Cubic Feet (From the 
Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2006”). 
 
The projected growth in U.S. demand is due, in part, to the decrease in natural gas 
shipments via pipeline from Canada.12  While Canada’s supply continues to diminish, 
natural gas demand in the U.S. continues to increase.  The rising demand will be met by 
increasing LNG imports, which will require a significant increase in the number of LNG 
import terminals.  
 
C. GROWING INFRASTRUCTURE 
As shown in Figure 4, there are presently six shore-side LNG terminals operating 
in the U.S.  However, only four of them are capable of supplying natural gas to the 48 
contiguous states.  Ironically, the facility in Kenai, Alaska, which commenced operation 
in 1969, is used to export natural gas from Alaska to Japan because there are no LNG 
import terminals on the West coast.13  A small LNG import terminal located 
approximately nine miles west of Ponce, Puerto Rico, provides gas to a power plant that 
supplies electricity to the island, but is also isolated from the continental U.S.  
The other four shore-side LNG import terminals were built in the 1970’s and the 
amount of LNG imported to the continental U.S. gradually increased until it peaked in 
                                                 
12 Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Natural Gas Imports and Exports 2004,” 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2005/ngimpexp/ngimpexp.pdf> 
(Accessed 21 April 2006), 3-4. 
13 Vaudolon, Liquefied Gases, 27. 
9 
1979.  Although two of the terminals were closed in 1980, domestic demand slowly 
returned and all four terminals are now back in operation.   
The Gulf Gateway Energy Bridge, an offshore LNG import terminal located 
approximately 116 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico, commenced 
operation in 2005.  This unique facility consists of only a specially designed buoy 
anchored to the seafloor.  Specially designed LNG tank ships, which are equipped with 
extensive vaporization equipment that is normally located at shore-side LNG import 
terminals, mate to the buoy, regasify the LNG, and pump the natural gas into a 
submerged pipeline and directly to market.  
 
Figure 4.   Existing Shore-side LNG Facilities (From Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, “Existing and Proposed LNG Terminals” 
<http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/indus-act/terminals/exist-prop-lng.pdf>). 
 
Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, in testimony before the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce in 2003, noted that a “major expansion” of 
North American LNG terminal import capacity is needed for the U.S. natural gas market 
to function properly.14  As shown in Figure 5, nineteen new import facilities have been 
approved and twenty more have been proposed for the U.S.   However, since only six to 
                                                 
14 House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Natural Gas Supply and Demand Issues, 108th Cong., 
2nd sess., 2003. 
10 
twelve new facilities are necessary to properly meet the anticipated increase in demand, 
not all of these facilities are expected be built.15, 16 
 
Figure 5.   Proposed Shore-side LNG Facilities (From Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, “Existing and Proposed LNG Terminals,” 
<http://ferc.gov/industries/lng/indus-act/terminals/exist-prop-lng.pdf >). 
 
The location of three of the existing facilities and the majority of the proposed 
facilities along the Gulf coast are separated from the expanding markets in the Northeast 
and West by great distances.  As shown in Figures 6 and 7, more than 213,000 miles of 
interstate pipelines transport natural gas from the Gulf Coast to markets across the U.S.17  
                                                 
15 Parfomak, Liquefied Natural Gas, 1. 
16 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Industries: Liquefied Natural Gas,” 
<http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng.asp#howmany > (Accessed 28 October 2006). 
17 Energy Information Administration, “Additions to Capacity on the U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline 
Network: 2005,” August 2006, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngpipeline/ngpipeline.pdf> 
(Accessed 30 October 2006), 4. 
11 
  In the past, LNG imports represented such a small share of the natural gas 
market that the location of import terminals had little influence on development of the 
pipeline network. Given the tremendous investment associated with the development of 
additional pipelines, new import terminals located in the Gulf are likely to rely on the 
existing pipeline infrastructure to move gas to markets. 
 
Figure 6.   Natural Gas Pipeline Flow in Millions of Cubic Feet Per Day 
(MMcf/d)(From the Energy Information Administration, “Additions to Capacity 
on the U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Network: 2005,” 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngpipelin
e/ngpipeline.pdf>). 
Natural gas is stored in underground facilities, such as salt domes and depleted 
natural gas or oil reservoirs.  In addition to meeting demand during peak times, the stored 
gas is used to balance the pressure in pipelines and is important to the proper operation of 
the entire natural gas supply and distribution network.18  As shown in Figure 7, there is 
no natural storage in New England or along the East coast and limited amounts in the 
West. 
                                                 
18 Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Underground Natural Gas Storage Developments: 1998-
2005,” October 2006, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngstorage/ngstorage.pdf > 
(Accessed 8 January 2006), 2. 
12 
 
Figure 7.   Location of Pipelines and Underground Natural Gas Storage Facilities 
(From the Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Underground Natural Gas 
Storage Developments 1998 – 2005”). 
 
In summary, natural gas production and infrastructure is largely concentrated 
along the Gulf coast.  An extensive interstate pipeline system transports the natural gas to 
markets throughout the country.  The natural gas industry is on the cusp of an 
unprecedented surge in investment and development of several new LNG import 
terminals, each of which will be subjected to the siting and licensing requirements 
established by the federal government.  
13 
D.   SITING AUTHORITY AND REQUIREMENTS 
 
“The goal of the FERC’s LNG Program is to ensure that projects which 
are found to be in the public interest are constructed and operate in a safe 
and secure fashion.”  
- Mark Robinson, Director of Office of Energy Project, FERC19 
Federal jurisdiction over LNG facilities is shared by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Committee (FERC), Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG).20  The jurisdictions and responsibilities of these agencies are intertwined 
and confusing. 
Under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 and subsequent legislation,  
DOT is responsible for establishing minimum safety standards for siting, design, 
construction and operation of LNG facilities.  The Pipeline Safety Act of 1994, which 
recodified the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, requires DOT to prescribe the 
minimum standards for deciding the location of a new LNG facility.21  In doing so, DOT 
is to consider the local population and demographics, surrounding property, and the 
ability of local resources to cope with risk created by the facility.  DOT also establishes 
minimum safety standards for the design, installation, construction, inspection and testing 
of LNG terminals.   
The FERC has exclusive authority to grant federal approval for siting of all LNG 
terminals, except LNG deepwater ports.  Proposed LNG facilities are evaluated by FERC 
to ensure they comply with the minimum standards established by DOT.  The FERC’s 
approval is always conditioned on the ability of the facility to satisfy other statutory 
requirements contained in the Clean Water Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and 
                                                 
19 Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Energy, The Future of 
Liquefied Natural Gas: Siting and Safety, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2005. 
20 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Interagency Agreement Among the FERC, USCG and 
RSPA for the Safety and Security Review of Waterfront Import/Export LNG Facilities,” 
<http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/2004-interagency.asp> (Accessed 16 October 2006). 
21 Title 49 U.S. Code, sec. 60103, <http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=966974425309+0+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve> (Accessed 9 January 2007). 
14 
Clean Air Act.22   Compliance with these requirements is determined by each individual 
state and construction can be blocked if the state determines the proposed LNG facility 
fails to meet one or more of these requirements and decides to withhold one or more of 
the necessary certificates or approvals. 
The FERC’s authority is derived from the Natural Gas Act of 1938, delegated 
from the Energy Secretary, and implemented in 18 C.F.R. Part 153.23  Specifically, the 
FERC has the authority to approve the place of entry and exit, siting, construction, and 
operation of new LNG terminals.  In accordance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, FERC prepares an environmental impact statement for each proposed LNG 
terminal.  Applicants are required to submit thirteen different Resource Reports that 
analyze various aspects of the proposed terminal.  Resource Report 11, Reliability and 
Safety, addresses potential hazards to the public from failures caused by “accidents and 
natural catastrophes” and discusses “how these events would affect reliability [of natural 
gas supply].”24  This report must discuss measures to protect the public from failure of 
the proposed facility, efforts to reduce risk, and contingency plans.   
LNG terminals floating or attached to the seabed beyond state waters are, by 
definition, LNG deepwater ports and are not authorized by FERC.  Under the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002, DOT is responsible for approving LNG deepwater 
ports; however, DOT delegated this authority to the Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
in June of 2003.  Although MARAD grants the approval, the USCG conducts the 
engineering, operations, safety, and environmental review of LNG deepwater ports, 
which are often referred to as “offshore” LNG terminals.  Though they must also comply 
with the National Environmental Policy Act, offshore LNG terminals are subject to 
different requirements than onshore terminals and must satisfy the standards in 33 C.F.R. 
Parts 148 through 150.  Since the governor of each adjacent coastal state has to grant 
                                                 
22 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “LNG – Laws and Regulations,” 
<http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/gen-info/laws-regs/state-rights.asp> (Accessed 9 January 2007). 
23 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Testimony of Pat Wood III, Chairman, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission before Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources, and Regulatory 
Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, US House of Representatives, June 22, 2004,” 
<http://ferc.gov/congress/cong-test/2004/06-22-04-wood.pdf> (Accessed 10 December 2006). 
24 Title 18 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, sec 380.12(m), 
<http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/10apr20061500/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2006/aprqtr/18cfr38
0.12.htm> (Accessed 12 January 2007). 
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approval before MARAD can authorize and license a new offshore LNG terminal, they 
have the authority to veto any proposal and are capable of blocking development of any 
LNG deepwater port.25 
  
E.   SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
The security requirements applicable to LNG terminals are contained in several 
different regulations.  Although these requirements may address the security of each 
individual facility, none of them consider the entire LNG supply and distribution 
network.  The vulnerability and impact of the proposed facilities on the critical 
infrastructure of the energy sector is not considered as part of the current siting review 
process.  
The DOT’s security regulations for onshore LNG terminals simply require 
posting of “No Trespassing” signs and only address site specific issues such as lighting, 
access control, monitoring, and communications.26  Similarly, security requirements 
enforced by the USCG as part of the of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) of 
1972 only discuss limiting access to the LNG transfer area, security patrols, protective 
enclosures for transfer control stations, and communications between facility personnel.27 
The PWSA requires the USCG to evaluate waterways impacted by new LNG 
terminals and determine their suitability for LNG marine traffic.  This assessment must 
consider the density and character of vessel traffic, natural and man-made obstructions 
and hazards, and the mooring arrangements of the LNG tank ships.28   
Although the PWSA does not explicitly specify security standards, the USCG 
modified its procedures in 2005 to include some security considerations in its review and 
                                                 
25 Energy Information Administration, “2002 Amendments to the Deepwater Port Act of 1974,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/amendments.html > 
(Accessed 11 January 2007). 
26 Title 49 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 193.2901 – 2917. 
27 Title 33 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 127.701 – 711. 
28 Title 33 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 127.209. 
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assessment of the waterway.29  With the unique aspects of the waterway in mind, a risk 
analysis is conducted to address the safety and security of LNG tank ships, public health 
and safety, protection of other critical infrastructure and key assets in the area, and 
consequence management.  Findings and recommendations regarding the suitability of 
the waterway are provided to the FERC for consideration as part of the environmental 
impact statement and used to develop a formal recommendation for those state and local 
agencies that have jurisdiction.  In accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security 
Act of 2002, all LNG terminals must undergo security assessments, develop security 
plans, and undergo examinations to verify compliance.30   
Despite efforts to improve the security of U.S. ports, the country remains 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks in its ports and waterways.31 Terrorists have clearly 
demonstrated the ease and effectiveness of suicide attacks using vessel-borne improvised 
explosive devices (VBIEDs). The National Strategy for Maritime Security concedes this 
mode of attack “has been established, tested, and repeated.”32 Prevention of suicide 
attacks is particularly difficult in ports and harbors, where ships are restricted from 
movement and are regularly in close proximity to many other vessels, including 
commercial fishing vessels, recreation boats, tug boats, and line handlers.  
To help address these risks, LNG tank ships are typically escorted to the LNG 
terminal by the USCG.  A Security Zone is established around the vessel to restrict other 
ships from approaching it. For instance, each time a tank ship enters Boston harbor to 
deliver LNG at the import in Everett, Massachusetts, a team from the local USCG office 
boards the vessel, airplane traffic in and out of Logan Airport and vehicle traffic over the 
Tobin bridge are suspended, and six tug vessels, two of which have advanced fire 
                                                 
29 U.S. Coast Guard, “Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 05-05, Guidance on Assessing the 
Suitability of a Waterway for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Marine Traffic,” June 14, 2005, 
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nvic/NVIC%2005-05.doc.pdf > (Accessed 15 November 2006), 4. 
30 Title 33 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 105.  
31 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation, Port Security Oversight, Testimony by RADM Craig E. Bone, 109th Cong., 1st 
sess., 29 June 2005. 
32 United States White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C.: White 
House, 2005), 4. 
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fighting capabilities, accompany the vessel.33  Though not identical, specific procedures 
are adopted in other ports to address the risk presented by LNG vessels.  
As the number of facilities and frequency of tanker shipments increases, the costs 
necessary to provide these security measures and mitigate the risks also grow. In 
addition, they increase the burden on the USCG, local law enforcement and other 
emergency response agencies. Some people have suggested it may become necessary for 
the LNG industry to help fund the security or provide a mechanism for government to 
recoup costs.34 
In summary, the safety and security requirements address the individual LNG 
terminal under consideration and its potential impact on the local community.  However, 
although it could affect an entire region of the country, the review process does not 
consider how damage or loss of a proposed LNG import terminal affects the nation’s 
natural gas supply and distribution.  
                                                 
33 Alan M. Herbst, "LNG Threat to Public Safety Probably Small, but Security Essential," Natural 
Gas & Electricity (September 2004): 13. 
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III. FEAR OF LNG 
“LNG has polarized the entire community.” 
- Director of community development organization in Harpswell, Maine35 
 
A. INCIDENT HISTORY 
LNG tank ships have made more than 33,000 safe transits since they began 
carrying LNG in 1959.  However, there have been only thirteen serious incidents at LNG 
terminals around the world.  
The first accident at a U.S. LNG facility occurred in 1944 at a “peak shaving” 
facility, which stores LNG for use during periods of peak demand.  Due to shortages in 
stainless steel alloys, less suitable materials were used to construct a storage tank in 
Cleveland, OH.  Consequently, the tank failed almost immediately after it was placed in 
service.  The LNG vaporized and formed a cloud of natural gas that drifted into a 
residential area before igniting and causing 128 deaths.36  
In 1977, an accident at a terminal in Algeria killed one person.  Two years later, a 
leak at the LNG import terminal in Cove Point, Maryland, resulted in the death of one 
individual.  A faulty pump seal permitted LNG to escape, vaporize, and spread through 
underground electrical conduit to a substation, where the gas ignited and caused an 
explosion.  More recently, a boiler explosion killed twenty seven workers at a large LNG 
facility in Algeria.37 
 
B. “EXPERT” PREDICTIONS 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, studies have been conducted to assess 
the safety hazards created by LNG terminals and tank ships.  Because large scale testing 
                                                 
35 Anne Ravana, “Fisherman Split over LNG Terminal Proposals,” Bangor Daily News, 7 September 
2006, <http://bangordailynews.com/news/t/statewide.aspx?articleid=142764&zoneid=500> (Accessed 7 
September 2006). 
36 Herbst, LNG Threat to Public Safety, 10. 
37 Paul Parformak and Aaron Flynn, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety & 
Regulation, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), 7. 
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has not been conducted, there are significant differences in the modeling, assumptions, 
and resulting conclusions.  The disagreement and inconsistency between the experts has 
produced controversy and confusion.  In an attempt to resolve the professional conflict, 
Sandia National Laboratories reviewed and compared the different studies.  However, the 
comprehensive report concluded that the “risks from accidental spills… are small and 
manageable…” but the “consequences from an intentional breach [of a cargo tank on an 
LNG tank ship] can be more severe than those from accidental breaches.”38  Similarly, a 
study released by the FERC stated it was only possible to provide “rough estimates” of 
the effects of large LNG releases on water because of the uncertainty inherent in the 
analysis methods.39   
As a result, both proponents and opponents believe the report supports their 
position and the ensuing controversy has yet to be resolved.40  The failure of experts to 
reach a consensus is fueling fears, leaving many community members to question the 
ability of government agencies to accurately assess the hazards.   
 
C.   TENSION IN THE COMMUNITY  
“They [LNG industry representatives] don’t really come out and answer 
questions….  They beat around the bush.” 
- Chairman of local fisherman’s association in Harpswell, Maine41  
The public’s anxiety and fear has led to the emergence of the NIMBY (“Not in 
My Backyard”) phenomenon, whereby people are passionately opposed to the 
introduction of LNG terminals into their neighborhoods and communities.42  Sufficient 
                                                 
38 Mike Hightower et al., Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water, Sandia National Laboratories, December 2004, 
<http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/storage/lng/sandia_lng_1204.pdf> (Accessed 12 September 
2006), 14. 
39 ABS Consulting, Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving Releases from Liquefied 
Natural Gas Carriers, 13 May 2004 <http://ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/cons-model.pdf> 
(Accessed 12 September 2006), iii. 
40 Parfomak, Liquefied Natural Gas, 7. 
41 Ravana, “Maine Fisherman Split Over LNG Terminal Proposals.” 
42 Frank Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge (London: 
Duke University Press, 2000), 122. 
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local opposition can defeat any proposed project, regardless of its importance to the 
region or country.43  Consider New England, where the limited availability of natural gas 
during peak demands in the winter of 2004 forced operators to limit distribution and shut 
down more than half of the gas-fired generators in New England.44  Despite these 
shortages, proposals to bring LNG into the Northeast are being met with stiff opposition.   
In addition to concerns regarding accidental failures, people who will live and 
work near the terminals fear well-planned deliberate attacks by terrorists who openly 
admit to targeting the energy sector’s critical infrastructure.  The inability of experts to 
reach a consensus on the vulnerabilities and consequences of an incident involving a ship 
loaded with LNG is creating additional confusion and concern.   
Fear and security concerns related to LNG became immediately apparent in the 
aftermath of 9/11 when officials in Boston, Massachusetts refused to let the LNG tank 
ship MATTHEW enter port to discharge its cargo.  Though it had been carrying LNG on 
a regularly scheduled route and transiting under the Tobin Bridge and past Logan Airport 
to the Distrigas Terminal every week for years, officials now feared that the ship may be 
attacked by terrorists and refused to let it enter port.45   
This type of fear and opposition is not limited to communities in the Northeast.  
More than 1,000 people, including many Hollywood celebrities, attended an event in 
Malibu, California to protest siting of the first import terminal on the West coast. Actor  
Pierce Brosnan stated construction of the terminal would have  “disastrous 
consequences” and Ted Danson argued that the community was selected for the terminal 
because industry viewed it as weak and unable to fight.46   
The public’s fears and suspicions are reflected in the actions of elected officials.  
After a LNG import terminal proposed for Fall River, Massachusetts was approved by 
FERC, the Rhode Island House of Representatives unanimously passed legislation to 
                                                 
43 Paul Hibbard, Demand, Supply and Facility Siting, Report to the National Commission on Energy 
Policy (Boston: Analysis Group, Inc., 2004), 19. 
44 Hibbard, U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 11. 
45 Marine Log, “LNG Matthew Banned from Boston,” Marine Log (27 September 2001), 
<http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMI/MMISep27.html > (Accessed 10 January 2007). 
46 Kriss Perras Running Waters, “Pierce Brosnan Brings out Malibu’s Hollywood Power to Oppose 
LNG,” PCH Press, 22 October 2006. <http://www.pchpress.com/> (Accessed 25 October 2006). 
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block LNG tank ships from transiting Narragansett Bay, which is the only way for them 
to get to the terminal.47  This was after representatives from Massachusetts managed to 
insert language into a transportation bill to prevent demolition of a draw bridge that 
restricts the width of ships which may pass, essentially making it impossible for existing 
LNG tank ships to reach the proposed terminal. Though the bridge is being replaced, the 
legislation provided $500,000 to modify the obsolete bridge and use it for bicycle and 
pedestrian traffic.48  The company seeking to build the terminal indicated they would 
overcome this obstacle by making more frequent trips with “skinnier” LNG tank ships 
especially designed for this transit.  FERC considered the increased traffic caused by 
using smaller ships and reaffirmed its previous approval, but elected officials from 
Massachusetts stated the project should not be permitted to go forward due to the 
excessive risk to the community.49 
 
Figure 8.   LNG Tank ship transiting beneath the Tobin Bridge in Boston (From 
<http://www.seafarersfriend.org/where/index.html>). 
 
                                                 
47 Joe Baker, "House Bill Would Block LNG Tankers from R.I. Waters" Newport Daily News, 11 May 
2006, <http://www.newportdailynews.com/articles/2006/05/11/news/news6.txt> (Accessed 11 May 2006). 
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Frustrated experts and industry leaders often claim the public is irrational, 
ignorant, and incapable of understanding the technical information they believe 
demonstrates the risk is low.50  Some senior representatives in federal agencies 
responsible for approving new terminals and pipelines have similar opinions.51  Mark 
Robinson, the Director of the Office of Energy Projects at FERC, has suggested the 
communities opposed to the introduction of LNG import terminals are naïve and 
susceptible to misinformation: 
When we [FERC] go into areas of the country that have a history of 
dealing with the petrochemical industry, they’re still very willing to listen 
to the facts and incorporate their concerns and comments and deal with it 
from there.  In other areas of the country, where they’re not quite as used 
to dealing with the petrochemical industry, it takes only one or more 
nonfactual statements to get out to folks and put them in a mode where 
they believe things about LNG that just flatly aren’t true.52   
Is the public behaving selfishly?  Not likely. Of course, all persons on different 
sides of any issue have their own interests in mind.  With the siting of a LNG import 
terminal, opponents are concerned with property values, pollution, and impacts on their 
personal security and health.  Though they may wish people to believe they are only 
trying to increase supply or improve the energy reliability for the nation, the company 
seeking to build the terminal is interested in making a profit. Other proponents for the 
terminal are just as likely to be persuaded by the personal economic benefits they may 
receive.  
Is the public ignorant or irrational? The issue is not simply a matter of ignorance 
or rationality.  The citizens in the community view risk differently than the experts and 
scientists.53  The experts apply science in an objective manner based on clearly defined 
principles and norms.  However, lay people in the community also consider the 
experiential dimensions of the issue.  Rather than rely on technical calculations and 
analyses, citizens apply “cultural” logic or rationality, which is not necessarily inferior to 
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the technical reason applied by experts.  Cultural rationality considers different aspects of 
the problem that are often neglected by the experts.  It focuses on personal experiences of 
individuals, not depersonalized expert studies produced by strangers using empirical 
evidence and the scientific method.54    
Stakeholders in the community perceive risk differently than scientists and 
engineers who study the technical issues.  The engineers and scientists who are 
considered “experts” focus on quantifying the probabilities and technical risks, and often 
give little thought to the broader impact the project has on the community.  They are 
typically focused only on the present and on risks associated only with their facility.  In 
contrast, average citizens are most interested in the broad ramifications and care less 
about technical probabilities and risk assessments.55  Unlike the engineers, members of 
the community are also more apt to be influenced by a historical perspective and memory 
of experiences they view as similar.56   
Comprehensive analyses performed by the scientists and engineers produce risk 
estimates to demonstrate the probability of experiencing an event with catastrophic 
consequences is statistically remote.  They typically conclude the facility presents an 
“acceptable risk.”57  However, if people believe the event is even remotely possible, such 
studies are not likely to address the public’s fear.58   
In some communities the citizens simply refuse to accept technical analyses 
produced by the risk experts.59  In response, experts strive to produce additional risk 
studies and technical data.  But regardless of the level of effort or amount of supporting 
scientific documentation produced, it is extremely difficult to satisfy public concerns with 
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technical assessments of the risk associated with a proposed LNG terminal.60  These 
attempts sometimes make matters even worse.61 
Though people on all sides of the issue are concerned about risk, the debate over 
the siting of LNG import terminals is as much about trust in the relationship between the 
community and the developer as it is about the perceived risk associated with the 
proposed terminal.62  As with other types of hazardous facilities, the uncertainty 
associated with the consequences of a large accident at a LNG import terminal and the 
unknown threat or probability of terrorist attack cause significant concern in the local 
community.  Given this uncertainty and the presence of many other difficult siting issues, 
trust and confidence between the community and the developers is crucial.  However, it 
seems this social trust is often missing.   
In this context, social trust is defined as a person’s expectation that other people 
or institutions involved in the siting process can be relied upon to act in a manner that is 
competent, predictable, and caring.63  To develop trust in an individual or institution, the 
community must be vulnerable to the actions the individual or institution may take.  In 
addition, members of the community must trust in the abilities and competencies of the 
institution and believe it has a caring attitude.  Lastly, the institution must consistently 
meet the expectations of the community.   Unfortunately, it takes so long to build trust 
that it may not be possible for developers to achieve a trusting relationship with the 
community in the relatively short amount of time afforded by the siting process.64 
Since it is the health and safety of the community that is potentially at risk, a 
community will not likely accept a terminal unless it is confident decision makers share 
their concerns, are competent, and will act fairly.  In spite of this, many experts remain 
convinced they can win public confidence by presenting scientific facts and results 
derived from complicated studies.  
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The probabilities developed by the experts and associated with the threats and 
events that create the greatest concern have a limited degree of precision.  As a result, 
technical specialists may be giving more credence and weight to the assessments than 
they deserve.  In addition, the experts must often make value judgments and equate 
injuries and deaths with a monetary cost in order to calculate the risks or consequences.  
Though the technical experts likely believe their results are unbiased and scientific, they 
may contain significant value judgments that are detected by members of the community.  
Like everyone else, scientists are human and subject to political and economic pressures.  
It is not difficult to imagine experts intentionally or unintentionally underestimating the 
risks.65  
In summary, the siting of LNG terminals is a very complex issue.  The 
consequences of a successful terrorist attack on a LNG tank ship or import terminal are 
debated by the “experts.”  This professional disagreement among members of the 
scientific community is exacerbating the public’s discomfort and fear.  With the 
exception of some areas in Texas and Louisiana that have extensive experience with 
LNG, communities are apt to be opposed to the introduction of new LNG import 
terminals in their “backyards.”  Additional scientific research, technical studies, and risk 
analyses are not likely to resolve this conflict. 
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IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
“Better defenses means more fences, more intrusion alarms, increased 
redundancy at the most vulnerable points in the electrical transmission 
grid, our gas pipelines, and so forth.  If one transmission line or pipeline 
is knocked out, others should be available to handle the load.”   
- Response from Robert Kupperman, then Chief Scientist of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, provided for interview conducted in 197866 
 
A. RESILIENCY VS. PROTECTION 
Critical infrastructures are vital to the security, economic prosperity, and quality 
of life in the U.S.67  Though much of the critical infrastructure in the United States is 
highly efficient, certain sectors exhibit signs of aging, geographic concentration, or 
overstress by high demand.68  These traits tend to exacerbate the impact of a failure, 
regardless of whether it is caused by the malicious intent of a terrorist or a natural 
disaster.  
The establishment of national policy regarding the importance and protection of 
critical infrastructure started during the Cold War with plans to ensure continuity of our 
government in the event of a nuclear attack.  An Executive Order issued in 1996 
acknowledged that some national infrastructure is vital to the defense and economic 
security of the U.S. and created the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection.  Based on the recommendations of the Commission, a National Goal was 
established to achieve the ability to protect the nation’s critical infrastructures from 
intentional acts by 2000.69  Efforts to meet this goal primarily focused on cyber threats 
and information networks.  
                                                 
66 “Terrorism: Why U.S. Is Vulnerable,” US News & World Report, 6 March 1978, 66. 
67 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Sec. 1016, Public Law 107-56, 107th Cong., (26 October 2001) 
<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107> (Accessed 6 February 2007). 
68 Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Report of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force,” January 
2006 < http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf >, 12 (Accessed 30 January 2007). 
69 Presidential Decision Directive 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” 22 May 1998 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm> (Accessed 28 November 2006). 
28 
The attacks on September 11, 2001, generated unprecedented interest in the need 
to protect critical infrastructure.  In February 2003, the White House published a national 
strategy for the physical protection of critical infrastructures.  The Under Secretary for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in the Department of Homeland 
Security was charged with the responsibility of assessing the vulnerabilities of the critical 
infrastructures in the U.S. and developing a comprehensive plan for securing them.70    
To date, the primary focus has been on protecting critical infrastructure by 
mitigating the terrorist threat.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 
specifically states its purpose is to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and protect 
it from terrorist attacks.71  This narrow view differs from the “all-hazards” approach 
emphasized by DHS. As demonstrated in 2003 by the power blackout in the Northeast 
and by the widespread destruction caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the 
consequences of failures caused by threats other than terrorism can also have devastating 
consequences.  
In 2005, the Homeland Security Advisory Council formed the Critical 
Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) and asked it to provide recommendations to advance 
national critical infrastructure policy and objectives.  The CITF focused on ensuring 
optimal delivery of critical infrastructure services in an “all-hazards environment” and 
reducing the consequences and disruption caused by damage or loss.72   
The majority of critical infrastructure, including the LNG import terminals and 
natural gas pipelines comprising the natural gas supply and distribution network, is 
owned and operated by several different entities within the private sector.  The CITF held 
numerous discussions with private-sector stakeholders and determined that businesses are 
more likely to make investments to provide continuity of operations than they are to 
expend resources in an attempt to simply protect infrastructure.73  Industry’s economic 
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interest and desire to sustain operations in the face of threats or unanticipated disruptions 
is in alignment with the federal government’s growing desire to improve the resiliency of 
critical infrastructure. 
It is not possible to protect every potential target from every conceivable threat.  
Though prevention efforts are necessary, they alone are not sufficient.  The CITF 
concluded that policies and strategies should focus on resilience instead of protection.  
Resilience is defined as the capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure 
in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must.74 
 
B.   INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS VS. NETWORKS  
Like other critical infrastructure sectors, the natural gas storage and distribution 
infrastructure did not evolve as a random, unstructured arrangement of import terminals, 
storage facilities, and pipelines.  Instead, the infrastructure, which is owned and operated 
by various companies, was developed over time in an optimal manner to maximize 
efficiency, economies of scale, and profit.75 
To properly determine the resiliency of critical infrastructure, the entire sector 
must be considered as a system.  It is not enough to simply isolate and evaluate separate 
LNG import terminals, pipelines, or power plants.  All of the individual components must 
be assessed together as a system.   
Typically, vulnerability and risk assessments are specific to just one particular 
piece, or component, of the infrastructure.  Since the vast majority of our critical 
infrastructure is privately owned and operated, this approach seems to make sense.  Each 
owner or operator is responsible for their components.  However, when federal, state and 
local governments are attempting to allocate the limited resources available for security 
and protection, the optimal distribution of resources can only be achieved if one 
understands the relationships between the different components and their relative 
importance to the overall health of the system.  Rather than making incremental 
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improvements in the security of all individual components, the entire system can be 
modeled and analyzed so that available resources can be distributed optimally.  
With increasing resiliency as the goal, it is important to understand how these 
components are interconnected and what impact a failure or attack on one component has 
on the others. To accomplish this, one must consider the various sectors of critical 
infrastructure as “networks.”  The individual assets or components, identified as “nodes,” 
in the network are connected to each other via “links.”76  In network modeling, nodes can 
represent any component of interest and will vary depending on the level of detail and the 
purpose or intent of the model.  They may be chemical facilities, ports, rail hubs, airports, 
or telecom hotels.  The links typically represent some type of relationship or connection 
between the nodes.  The nodes with the most links are the most interconnected and serve 
as “hubs.”  They are especially important because damage to the network is often 
maximized by their removal.   
For natural gas supply and distribution, network resiliency is measured by its 
ability to keep supplying and distributing natural gas in spite of damage to pipelines, 
LNG import terminals, storage, and other gas sources.  Evaluating the resiliency of a 
network includes the identification and assessment of bottlenecks, points of maximum 
consequences, and damage tolerance.  In addition, interdependencies of network 
components, impacts of failures, and risk mitigation possibilities are also considered.   
 
C. NETWORK MODELING 
The natural gas supply and distribution network consists of interconnected import 
terminals, processing facilities, underground storage areas, and pipelines.  For this study, 
the flow of natural gas to twenty four states in the eastern half of the United States was 
considered.  The pipelines connecting these states carry natural gas from the Gulf of 
Mexico to markets in the Midwest and along the East coast, accounting for approximately 
75% of the nation’s total natural gas flow.   
                                                 
76 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 78. 
31 
The data used to model the networks were obtained from the FERC and the EIA, 
which is responsible for providing statistics and information relevant to energy 
production and demand.77   
 
1.  Network Variations 
To demonstrate the merit of using network theory to predict the impact new LNG 
import terminals will have on the resiliency of the natural gas supply and distribution 
infrastructure, three permutations of the network are modeled and analyzed. 
a) “Total Network” – The Total Network contains all existing, proposed, and 
approved LNG import terminals.78  However, as discussed in Chapter II, 
Section C, only a few of the new terminals will likely ever be built.  
b) “Dispersed Network” – The Dispersed Network includes all existing LNG 
import terminals and eight of the proposed or approved terminals located 
in different geographic areas along the East and Gulf coasts. 
c) “Concentrated Network” - The Concentrated Network contains all existing 
LNG import terminals and eight of the new terminals proposed or 
approved for either Texas, Louisiana, or Mississippi. 
Each permutation is modeled using Network Analysis 4.0.79  This software 
program allows the user to define any network as a system of interconnected nodes and 
links, each with its own value or weighting relative to the other nodes and links.   
Each state is considered as a node.  All of the natural gas pipelines that transport 
the gas between two adjacent states are combined and modeled as one link joining the 
two state nodes.  Import terminals are modeled as source nodes and supply natural gas to 
the network.  Each state also has a “sink” node attached to it to represent its own natural 
gas demand. 
                                                 
77 Energy Information Administration, Mission and Overview, 2 October 2006, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/aboutEIA/quickfacts.html> (2 October 2006).  
78 This variation of the network includes the existing, proposed, and approved terminals in October 
2006.  For a current list of LNG terminals and their status, see: 
<http://ferc.gov/industries/lng.asp#howmany>.  
79 The software and user guide are available at no cost from the Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security and can be accessed at https://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list. 
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2.  States 
Since the majority of the increase in demand is expected to occur over the next 
twenty years, the anticipated demand in 2017 was modeled.80  The predicted maximum 
peak consumption per day for each state in 2017 was determined by dividing each state’s 
annual consumption in 2004 by 365 to get the average daily demand, adjusting it to 
model the maximum seasonal demand, and applying a factor to represent the predicted 
growth.81  Maximum seasonal demand was derived by analyzing monthly consumption 
data.82  The demand for natural gas was 43% greater in January than the monthly 
average.  Accordingly, the daily demand, or consumption, for each state was increased by 
43% to represent its peak daily demand.  In addition, the maximum demand for each state 
was further increased to model future growth predicted by the EIA, which ranged from 
0.5% to 1.3% per year.83  Table 1 presents the peak demand expected for each state in 
2017. 
The natural gas flow through each node is modeled in Network Analysis 4.0 as an 
“Economic Loss” measured in millions of cubic feet per day (MMcf/d).  To prevent the 
software from artificially restricting flow, the capacity of each state node was modeled as 
the sum of the maximum flows into the node. 
                                                 
80 Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2006,” 85. 
81 Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas Consumption by End Use,” 
<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm> (Accessed 29 September 2006). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2006,” 85. 
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Table 1.   Natural Gas Demand for Each State 
State 
Maximum Daily 




























Pipelines are the links between the nodes.  The capacity and direction of natural 
gas flow was determined by analyzing data obtained directly from the EIA.  The 
capacities of all major interstate pipelines were summed to determine the maximum flow 
capacity between each pair of adjacent states. The results are displayed in Table 2.84  
Like nodes, the flow through each link is modeled in Network Analysis 4.0 as an 
“Economic Loss” in units of MMcf/d.  
It should be noted that this is only an approximation of the connectivity of the 
nodes, as each link really represents all of the significant natural gas pipelines that cross 
the border between each pair of adjacent states.  For instance, the flow from New York to 
Connecticut is almost divided equally between two pipelines.  Similarly, the majority of 
the natural gas transported from Pennsylvania to New Jersey is delivered via three main 
pipelines, with one of them responsible for nearly 50% of the flow.  Alabama and 
                                                 
84 James Tobin (Natural Gas Industry Analyst, Energy Information Administration), email to author, 
29 September 2006. 
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Tennessee each have six pipelines with capacities greater than 500 MMcf/d that carry 
natural gas across the border from Mississippi. 
 
Table 2.   Direction and Capacity of Pipeline Flow 




AL FL 3,354 
AL GA 6,112 
CT RI 760 
GA SC 3,885 
IL IN 6,199 
IN OH 4,160 
KY IL 1,544 
KY IN 2,406 
KY OH 3,843 
KY WV 2,663 
LA MS 14,135 
MD PA 2,050 
ME NH 600 
MS AL 12,907 
MS TN 9,913 
NC VA 2,870 
NH MA 400 
NJ NY 2,456 
NY CT 1,530 
NY MA 1,059 
OH PA 2,125 
OH WV 1,380 
PA NJ 5,247 
PA NY 550 
RI MA 385 
SC NC 3,692 
TN KY 12,581 
TX LA 3,826 
VA MD 3,280 
WV PA 4,040 
 
4. LNG Import Terminals 
The maximum natural gas supply, or daily “send out” capacity, for each proposed 
and existing LNG import terminal was obtained from FERC and is listed below in Table 
3.85  LNG import terminals are modeled as source nodes. 
                                                 
85 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Existing and Proposed LNG Terminals,” 
<http://ferc.gov/industries/lng/indus-act/terminals/exist-prop-lng.pdf > (Accessed 29 September 2006). 
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El Paso - Southern LNG Elba Island, GA 2,100 Existing Existing 
Southern Union - Trunkline LNG Lake Charles, LA 2,100 Existing Existing 
Gulf Gateway Energy Bridge Gulf of Mexico 500 Existing Existing 
Suez/Tractebel - DOMAC Everett MA 1,035 Existing Existing 
Dominion - Cove Point LNG Cove Point, MD 1,800 Existing Existing 
Cameron LNG - Sempera Energy Hackberry, LA 2,600 X X 
Creole Trail LNG - Cheniere LNG Cameron, LA 3,300   
Weaver's Cove Energy Fall River, MA 800  X 
Crown Landing LNG - BP Logan Township, NJ 1,200  X 
Cheniere/Freeport LNG Dev Freeport, TX 4,000 X X 
Sabine Pass Cheniere LNG Sabine, TX 4,000   
Cheniere LNG Corpus Christi, TX 2,600 X X 
Vista Del Sol - ExxonMobil Corpus Christi, TX 1,100   
Golden Pass - ExxonMobil Sabine, TX 2,000   
Ingleside Energy - Occidental Energy Corpus Christi, TX 1,000 X  
Sempra Port Arthur, TX 3,000 X X 
Port Pelican - Chevron Texaco Gulf of Mexico 1,600   
Gulf Landing - Shell Offshore LA 1,000   
AES Battery Rock Boston MA 800   
Safe Harbor Energy Offshore NY 2,000   
Freedom Energy Center - PWG Philadephia, PA 600   
AES Sparrows Point - AES Corp Baltimore, MD 1,500   
Quoddy Bay Pleasant Point, ME 2,000  X 
Downeast LNG - Kestrel Energy Robbinston, ME 500   
Gulf LNG Energy Pascagoula, MS 1,300   
Casotte Landing - ChevronTexaco Pascagoula, MS 1,300 X  
Broadwater Energy - Transcanada/Shell Long Island Sound, NY 1,000  X 
Calhoun LNG- Gulf Coast LNG Partners Port Lavaca, TX 1,000 X  
Suez Calypso - Suez LNG Offshore FL 0   
Bienville Offshore Energy Terminal Gulf of Mexico 1,400   
Beacon Port Clean Energy Terminal  Gulf of Mexico 1,500 X  
Main Pass McMoRan Exp Offshore LA 1,000   
Northeast Gateway - Excelerate Energy Offshore MA 800   
Neptune LNG - Suez LNG Offshore MA 400   
 
5. Storage 
Approximately 7,500,000 MMcf of gas are stored in underground natural 
facilities, such as large salt domes and depleted reservoirs.  Natural gas is added to these 
reserves from late spring until fall, when demand is relatively low, and accessed during 
winter months when demand peaks.  Although LNG is stored in approximately 100 peak 
shaving plants, the total amount stored is less than 15% of that kept in natural 
underground storage.86  These small LNG storage facilities are not included in these 
analyses. 
                                                 
86 Energy Information Administration, “U.S. LNG Markets and Uses,” 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2003/lng/lng2003.pdf> (Accessed 9 
January 2007), 11. 
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Of the twenty six states included in the network, fourteen have underground 
storage.  The amount of natural gas stored in each of them in October of 2004 is shown in 
Table 4.  It should be noted that with the exception of New York, which accounts for 
only 4% of the stored gas in the network, there is no storage in the Northeast.   
The stored gas at each node could be lost as a “consequence” of a node failure or 
attack and is modeled as “other loss” for the corresponding state nodes in Network 
Analysis 4.0.  The amount stored was converted to a daily average to provide consistency 
with the units of flow. 
 
Table 4.   Stored Natural Gas 
State Storage (MMcf) 
“Daily” Storage 
(MMcf/d) 
IL 936,941 2,632 
PA 728,031 2,045 
TX 574,578 1,614 
LA 540,155 1,517 
OH 533,056 1,497 
WV 472,884 1,328 
KY 218,741 614 
NY 190,407 535 
MS 140,609 395 
IN 110,405 310 
MD 61,352 172 
AL 9,347 26 
VA 7,223 20 
TN 879 2 
 
D. NETWORK ASSESSMENT  
 
1. Hub Analyses 
For each network variation, the structure and connectivity is evaluated and the 
general characteristics are examined.  Critical nodes and links are identified based on 
their connectivity to other network elements.  In addition, the effectiveness of 
investments to reduce the risk in each network is determined and compared.  The optimal 
allocation strategy to achieve minimal risk in each network is established and the 
investment priorities are compared.  
In Network Analysis 4.0, the “vulnerability” of a given component is defined as 
the probability of a fault, or the probability that the component will fail.  The “risk” posed 
by a component’s failure is the product of its vulnerability and “damage consequence.”  
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Each component’s damage consequence has a corresponding “elimination cost,” which 
defines the investment necessary to secure the node or link and protect it from any 
damage or loss.  Resources invested to protect an individual component reduce its 
vulnerability.   
In this study, the investment necessary to protect each node and link and entirely 
prevent it from losing flow was assumed to be equal for all nodes and links and arbitrarily 
set at a value of ten monetary units.  Similarly, for nodes that have natural gas storage, 
the investment required to perfectly protect the stored gas was also assumed to be ten 
monetary units. 
The relationship between the resources invested in a component’s elimination 
costs and the corresponding reduction in vulnerability is assumed to be linear.  In other 
words, doubling the investment in a node will cut its vulnerability and the consequences 
of its loss in half.  In reality, this is probably not true.  More likely, the amount of 
additional security that can be achieved with each dollar spent continually diminishes at 
some exponential rate or the relationship between the elimination costs and vulnerability 
is discontinuous, or “stepped.”  However, since this study is only intended to compare the 
network permutations to show how they differ, assuming a linear relationship between 
elimination costs and consequences will not impact the results.    
Presuming any network can be made more secure by making investments and 
purchasing improvements that reduce the probability of failure and vulnerability of the 
individual nodes and links, Network Analysis 4.0 prescribes the investment strategy that 
produces the lowest possible network risk.  The optimal resource allocation strategy is 
determined by letting it “emerge” from the network.  It begins by initially distributing the 
available budget equally between the links and nodes.  A “donor” node or link is then 
randomly selected and some of its portion of budget is reinvested in a randomly selected 
“recipient” node or link.  If the total network risk is not decreased, the dollar is returned 
to the donor; otherwise, the recipient keeps it. This organizing principle is repeated until 
the pattern representing the best allocation strategy emerges.87   
                                                 
87 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 153. 
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The hub analyses provide useful information about each network’s structure and 
help identify the critical components.  However, the value of nodes and links in the 
analyses are directly related to their maximum capacity.   A hub analysis does not 
consider the optimal flow in each pipeline necessary to best satisfy the demand of all 
nodes in the network.  In performing a hub analysis, Network Analysis 4.0 assumes 
damage to a pipeline with a high maximum capacity is a greater loss than damage to a 
smaller pipeline, even though the smaller pipeline may actually have more flow than the 
larger pipeline.  In order to evaluate the resiliency of a supply and distribution network, it 
is also necessary to consider the impact of damage on various network components.   
 
2. Damage Analyses 
To facilitate this study, a model was created in Microsoft Office Excel 2003 to 
simulate the Concentrated and Dispersed Networks.  Individual formulas were developed 
for the nodes in each network to mathematically represent the physical constraints of 
network flow.   
The Solver function in Microsoft Excel was then used to determine the optimal 
network flow by adjusting the “consumption,” or supply, of each node and the flow in 
each link.    
The following constraints were modeled for each network: 
o Node Flowin ≤ (Node Flowout + Node Demand):  For each node, the 
sum of all natural gas flow “in” must not exceed the node’s demand 
and the sum of all flow “out” of the node.  In this manner, the 
conservation of mass is preserved at each node.    
o Node Consumption ≤ Node Demand:  For each node, the amount of 
natural gas supplied to each node is not allowed to exceed the node’s 
demand.  This does not consider the ability of some nodes to store 
natural gas.  Permitting storage at the nodes would complicate the 
model significantly and is not necessary to demonstrate the efficacy of 
the technique and theory.   
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o Node Consumption ≥ 0:  For each node, consumption, or supply, 
cannot be less than 0.  A node cannot have “negative” consumption. 
o │Link Flow│ ≤ Link Capacity:  For each link, the flow must not 
exceed its specified maximum flow capacity.  This ensures that the 
natural gas flow in each pipeline does not exceed its physical 
limitations; however, unlike the hub analysis, the flow is permitted to 
go in either direction.  
 
After the optimal flow for the network is established, damage to individual 
pipelines and import terminals is simulated by setting the corresponding flow capacities 
to zero.  Flow degradation is assessed by evaluating the maximum possible flow in the 
“damaged” network and comparing it to the optimal flow in the undamaged, or “intact,” 
network.   Though solutions are not necessarily unique and more than one combination of 
pipeline flow may satisfy the constraints, the most severe damage scenarios are 
determined for each network by performing several analyses.  As a result, the resiliency, 
or ability of each network to continue to supply natural gas and satisfy demand in the face 
of natural and man-made damages, is determined.  
The maximum allowable pipeline flow, demand, and supply modeled in the 
damage analyses are different from the models used in hub analyses performed using 
Network Analysis 4.0.  The values for each are presented with the results in Figures 20 
and 21.  This is necessary to accurately determine flow efficiency and satisfy the 
constraints.  The damage analyses model the demand and optimal flow of natural gas in 
2030, which experts predict must be satisfied by new LNG import terminals.  In 2004, 
650,000 MMcf were imported and current projections indicate 4,360,000 MMcf of LNG 
will be needed to meet the U.S. demand in 2030.88  As a result, in 2030 the supply and 
distribution network in the U.S. will need to accommodate the difference, or 3,710,000 
                                                 
88 Philip Budzik (Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Energy Information Administration), 
email to author, 8 December 2006. 
 
Ideal Flow Efficiency = Total of LNG Imports / Total Network Demand 
Actual Flow Efficiency = LNG Supplied to Nodes / Total Network Demand 
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MMcf of additional natural gas.  Assuming it is distributed equally over the entire year, 
this will result in an additional flow of 10,421 MMcf/d.  
Because the twenty four states modeled in the Concentrated and Dispersed 
Networks consumed three quarters of the natural gas imported in 2004, it is assumed 
these networks will need to accommodate 75% of the new flow, or 7,815 MMcf/d in 
2030.  This additional demand is distributed proportionally among the states based on a 
relative comparison of their individual demands in 2004.  Similarly, the 7,815 MMcf/d of 










































Domestic & Canadian Natural Gas LNG Imports
 
Figure 9.   Total Annual Supply of Natural Gas in Trillion Cubic Feet (Data from the 
Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2006” 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo06/aeoref_tab.html>). 
 
The pipeline capacity is conservatively assumed to remain constant.  No new 
pipeline construction is considered.  As shown in Figure 9, the pipeline capacity needed 
to transport both the domestically produced natural gas and the gas imported from 
Canada is expected to remain relatively constant until 2030.  Any existing excess 
capacity in the pipelines can be assumed available for transporting natural gas imported 
by new LNG terminals in the form of LNG.  The excess capacity available, or assumed 
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flow capacity, for each pipeline is the difference between its maximum capacity and 
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V. RESULTS OF NETWORK ANALYSES 
 “We can site all the LNG we want in the Gulf, but it won’t help people in 
New England.” - senior FERC official89 
 
A.   NETWORK OBSERVATIONS  
Graphical representations of the three networks studied in this work, Total, 
Dispersed, and Concentrated, are shown in Figures 10, 11 and 12, respectively.  Each 
state has a yellow node, which represents the natural gas flow passing through the state 
and its natural gas storage, as applicable.  The red node represents the natural gas demand 
for the state.  The green nodes represent the existing and proposed LNG import terminals.   
Each of the figures contains a histogram in the lower left corner with the number of nodes 
with degree “g” (nodes having g links) plotted versus “g.” 
All three networks share some common traits.  As shown by the histograms, the 
number of links is not uniformly distributed.  Instead, in each network a small number of 
nodes have the majority of the links.  Rather than exhibiting characteristics of a random 
network, the histograms indicate the presence of a “scale-free” network, which is a 
network which contains a few highly connected nodes.90  The distribution of links in each 
network follows a power law where the probability of a node having a degree “g” is 
proportional to (g)-P, where P is greater than 1.  Though the “demand” node modeled for 
each state has a degree of only 1 and artificially increases total number of nodes in the 
network, the distribution of links still follows a power law if the demand nodes are not 
included, as shown in Figure 13.  
Because most nodes in a scale-free network have less than the average number of 
links and a random attack on one of the nodes is not likely to hit one of the few, highly 
connected hubs, these networks are generally viewed as “fault-tolerant.”  That is, a 
random attack is not likely to take out the high-value hubs.91   Though this provides some 
assurance for the reliability of the network under natural circumstances, terrorists are not 
                                                 
89 Paul Parfomak, Liquefied Natural Gas, 13. 
90 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 82.  
91 Ibid., 98.  
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likely to select targets at random.  Consequently, it becomes even more important to 
identify and protect critical nodes and links.  
Because the import terminals are “source” nodes, there can be no flow without 
them, and even though they have a degree of only one, they are especially important.  In 
the network approach, these become high value targets where a successful attack has dire 
consequences.  In addition, examination of the network reveals the importance of the 
pipelines linking Texas to Louisiana and Louisiana to Mississippi.  Major pipelines split 
in Mississippi and branch off to the Midwest and South.  Natural gas from the Gulf coast 
flows through Kentucky to underground storage in the Midwest and Northeast.  
 
 
Figure 10.   Graphic representation and histogram for the Total Network 
 
In the Total Network, Louisiana and Texas are the most highly connected nodes, 
with degrees of 12 and 10, respectively.  As such, they serve as hubs in the network and 
loss of either of these nodes would seriously impact the performance of the network. 
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As previously stated, it is estimated that only 25% of the LNG import terminals 
depicted in the Total Network will be constructed.  Since further study of this network 
has limited practical application, additional analysis and discussion is dedicated to the 
analysis and comparison of the Dispersed and Concentrated Networks.  
 
Figure 11.   Graphic representation and histogram for the Concentrated Network 
 
In the Concentrated Network, Texas and Louisiana are still the primary hubs, but 
with a degree of only seven.  Though they appear to be of equal value based on their 
connectivity, the amount of flow each provides to the network must be considered.  The 
five supply nodes attached to Texas supply 47% of the entire network’s natural gas.  
Texas provides 73% more gas to the network than Louisiana’s four supply nodes, but it is 
relatively isolated from the network.  None of the natural gas provided by supply nodes 
linked to Texas can be transported and used to satisfy the demand of other nodes in the 
network unless it flows through Louisiana.  Consequently, if the supply nodes of Texas 
are considered in addition to its own, Louisiana provides 75% of the entire network’s 
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supply.  If the Louisiana state node is damaged or “eliminated,” meaning flow through 
Louisiana is disrupted, the entire network must compete for the limited gas provided by 
the four remaining supply nodes connected to Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia, and 
Mississippi.   
 
Figure 12.   Graphic representation and histogram for the Dispersed Network 
 
Though the individual capacity of each import terminal selected for each of the 
networks is unique, the total amount of LNG supplied to each network is nearly the same.  
The 23,635 MMcf/day supplied in the Dispersed Network is only 3% less than the 
amount provided in the Concentrated Network.   The Dispersed Network has five nodes 
with a degree of six and, based on the histogram, is also scale-free.  Relative to the other 
nodes in the network, Louisiana still has a high degree.  However, in comparison to the 
Concentrated Network, it is much less critical.   
The supply nodes linked to Texas provide only 30% of the of the Dispersed 
Network’s entire natural gas supply.  If its own three supply nodes are considered 
together with natural gas received from Texas, Louisiana is responsible for providing 
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51% of the Dispersed Network’s supply.  Though this is, indeed, a significant amount, it 
is 33% less than the amount provided by Louisiana in the Concentrated Network.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Histogram of the Dispersed Network without individual demand nodes still 
indicates presence of a “scale-free” network. 
 
In summary, the nodes with the greatest degree of connectivity are the hubs. 
Knowledge of the hubs is useful, but does not tell us much about the value of supply 
nodes because they have only one link and may be undervalued.  We can derive 
qualitative results, but knowledge of demand, supply, and flow can be used in a hub 
analysis to obtain quantitative assessment of flow and the optimal resource allocation to 
reduce network risk.   
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B. HUB ANALYSES 
The result of the hub analyses of the Total Network are presented in Figure 14.   
A few investments carefully targeted to protect some of the most valuable nodes 
dramatically reduce overall risk to the network.  Investing only 20% of the sum of all 
elimination costs for all nodes and links eliminates 80% of the “overall” network risk, 
which is represented by the curve for “Flow and Storage Combined” and considers both 
network flow and stored natural gas.  However, if the goal is to only secure network flow, 
the same reduction in risk can nearly be achieved by investing only half as much.  If 
properly allocated, a 13% investment can fund elimination costs and improve the 
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Figure 14.   Hub Analysis Results for the Total Network 
 
Of course, in order to be effective, the investments must be made to secure the 
appropriate nodes and links.  Network Analysis 4.0 determines the optimal investment 
strategy for any given budget.  As an example, Figure 15 demonstrates an investment of 
100 arbitrary monetary units, a fraction of the total amount necessary to completely 
secure all nodes and links, will reduce by nearly half the risk to the network’s flow and 
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storage.   To accomplish this, the $100 budget is allocated as shown in the bar chart at the 
bottom of Figure 15 and split evenly between Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky 
and Pennsylvania, which are represented by nodes 34, 35, 36, 55 and 60, respectively.   
As discussed in Chapter IV, for the purpose of this study the investment necessary 
to protect each node and link and entirely prevent it from losing flow was assumed to be 
equal for all nodes and links and, for the sake of simplicity, set at a value of ten arbitrary 
monetary units.  Similarly, for each node that stores gas, the investment required to 
perfectly protect the stored gas was also assumed to be ten monetary units. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Allocation Strategy for Budget to Reduce Combined Risk in Total Network 
 
The results for the Concentrated and Dispersed Networks are presented in Figures 
16, 17, and 18.  The difference in the return on investment between the two networks is 
negligible.  Based on the hub analyses, there is no apparent advantage of one network 
over the other.  Though the optimal resource allocation strategies for the two are 
different, nearly identical reductions in overall risk can be achieved for equivalent levels 
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of investments to fund elimination costs.  It is important to note that these results assume 
that the risks can be eliminated and that the elimination costs are essentially identical.  A 
more careful analysis would likely reveal that such costs are dramatically different 
between the nodes in the different networks. 
The similarity between the results for the different networks may initially seem 
surprising; however, with the exception of just four supply nodes and links, the Dispersed 
and Concentrated Networks are, in fact, the same.  In addition, the amount of gas the four 
nodes supply, which determines the consequence and risk associated with their loss, are 
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Figure 16.   Relative Cost to Protect Natural Gas Flow 
 
Like the Total Network, the return on investments to protect the flow of natural 
gas in the Concentrated and Dispersed networks is not linear.  If allocated properly, 
investing only 10% of the cumulative elimination costs of all nodes and links improves 
network availability enough to eliminate 55% of the risk, as shown in Figure 16.  Though 
the risk can be significantly reduced with relatively small investment, the return does 
diminish quickly with each subsequent dollar spent.  Elimination of the last 10% of 
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Figure 17.   Relative cost to protect natural gas flow and storage 
 
Though investments made to protect natural gas stored in various nodes within the 
network do not produce the same return as those made to ensure flow, they are still 
favorable.  For either of the networks, investing approximately 25% of the total 
elimination cost for the fourteen nodes with stored gas reduces the risk to the stored gas 
by 50%.  
The hub analyses of the Concentrated and Dispersed Networks demonstrate a 
given budget achieves nearly identical risk reductions for each of them, but the optimal 
allocation strategy to achieve the reduced risk are different in each network.   Table 4 
contains a relative ranking of nodes and links for each network.  The order in which the 
nodes and links should receive funding varies with the network and the goal of the 
investment. For instance, if the budget is intended to reduce the risk to stored gas, then 
Pennsylvania is the first node to receive funding.  However, if the goal is to protect flow 
or reduce the overall risk to either of the networks, different nodes should be protected.  
Texas is the first node to be funded in the Concentrated Network, but only receives 
funding in the Dispersed Network after ten other nodes have been secured and when risk 














0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%









Dispersed Network Concentrated Network
 
 
Figure 18.   Relative cost to protect stored natural gas 
 
It should be noted that the nodes with the most links are not necessarily the first 
nodes that should receive funding.  Referring back to Figure 11, Louisiana had a degree 
of seven and was one of the most connected nodes in the Concentrated Network.  Though 
Mississippi and Kentucky have fewer links, the maximum potential natural gas flow into 
them is greater.  As a result, reducing the risk to gas flowing into Mississippi and 
Kentucky is more important to the overall risk to the network.  
Though these results demonstrate it is possible to determine relative differences in 
the risk and vulnerability of various network configurations, the hub analysis algorithm 
used in Network Analysis 4.0 has two limitations when applied to the LNG supply and 
distribution network.    
First, the value of each node and link in these analyses is based on their maximum 
capacity, rather than the actual or optimal flow rate.  Assuming the connectivity of two 
different nodes is equal, damage to the node with the highest maximum flow capacity 
will always be considered a greater loss in a hub analysis, regardless of the actual flow in 
the node.  The same is true for links.   
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Table 5.   Relative Ranking of Nodes and Links 
 Protect Flow Protect Stored Natural Gas Protect Overall Loss (Flow and Stored gas)
Priority Dispersed Concentrated Dispersed Concentrated Dispersed Concentrated 
1 KY TX PA PA KY TX 
2 MS MS LA TX PA LA 
3 LA KY IL LA LA KY 
4 PA LA OH IL MS MS 
5 AL PA TX OH AL PA 
6 OH AL WV WV OH AL 
7 IN OH KY KY IN OH 
8 MD IN NY NY TX IN 
9 GA GA MS MS MD GA 
10 TN TN IN IN MD TN 
11 TX MD MD MD GA WV 
 
Secondly, the algorithm favors hubs over links when determining the optimal 
resource allocation strategy.  The cost of losing a node is determined by taking the 
damage consequences entered by the user and increasing them by a factor equal to the 
degree of connectivity of the node.  However, the damage value of a link is always 
equivalent to the damage consequences, as defined by the user when modeling the 
network.  As a result, a link with a user-defined damage consequence of 1000 MMcf/d 
will be less valuable than a node that is linked to three other nodes and has a damage 
consequence of  only 400 MMcf/d (total damage value of 3 x 400 MMcf/d = 1200 
MMcf/d).   
The results of the hub analyses help identify critical nodes and links and provide 
useful information about the structure of each network configuration.  However, the 
ability of each network to supply natural gas and meet the demands of the individual 
states when its nodes or links are attacked must also be considered.  
 
C.  DAMAGE ANALYSES  
To assess the effect of damage, the optimal flow of the “intact” Concentrated and 
Dispersed networks must first be established.  Once the optimal network flows are 
understood, the impact of damage to individual components can be determined.  The 
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damage analyses will demonstrate the advantages of the Dispersed Network over the 
Concentrated Network.  
 The optimal flow distribution for the Concentrated and Dispersed Networks are 
presented in Figures 19 and 20.  Though the LNG is imported differently, each network is 
able to distribute it efficiently through existing pipelines and achieves a maximum 
possible flow efficiency of just slightly less than 100%.  In the Concentrated Network, 
Texas (TX) is unable to accommodate its entire share of the imports and still satisfy the 
constraints of the problem.  The maximum the Texas node can accommodate is 3,512 
MMcf/d, which satisfies 100% of its own demand (2,202 MMcf/d) and maximizes the 
flow capacity of the link connecting Texas to Louisiana (1,310 MMcf/d);  however, this 
is 183 MMcf/d, or 5%, less than the proportionate amount allocated to it.  Similarly, 
Maine is unable to accommodate 39% of its entire share, or 256 MMcf/d, in the 
Dispersed Network.   
Though there are many solutions that satisfy the constraints and achieve the 
maximum flow efficiency for each scenario studied, the results in Figure 20 highlight an 
interesting consequence that may arise when supply is concentrated in one region of the 
country.  Though the flow efficiency for the entire network is 97.7%, the states closest to 
the import terminals supplying the network are satisfied while the nodes representing 
Maine and New Hampshire, which are at the end of the supply chain, receive no natural 




Figure 19.   Optimal Flow for Concentrated Network 
 
In the Dispersed Network, the network flow efficiency in the intact condition is 
nearly equivalent to the Concentrated Network’s efficiency.  However, flow in individual 
pipelines varies considerably.   Again, though the solutions are not unique, some general 
trends can be identified.  In the Concentrated Network, all of the pipeline capacity joining 
Texas and Louisiana (tx1) is used.  As expected, flow from Texas to Louisiana is reduced 
significantly in the Dispersed Network, dropping from 1310 to 368.8 MMcf/d.   Since 
there is relatively little pipeline capacity to carry gas from Maryland to markets in the 
Northeast, pipelines leading south and west from the mid-Atlantic, such as “va1” and 
“nc1,” have considerably more flow in the Dispersed Network.   For some pipelines, such 












TX 2,202 2,202 3,512 100.0% 100.0% tx1 1310.0 1310 TX LA
LA 717 720 2,134 99.5% 46.4% la1 2726.9 5873 LA MS
MS 155 159 414 97.9% 5.9% ms1 332.4 5631 MS AL
AL 215 218 0 98.5% 62.3% ms2 2653.2 4258 MS TN
FL 409 413 0 99.2% 28.4% al1 409.4 1442 AL FL
GA 218 221 669 98.5% 11.0% al2 -292.1 2648 AL GA
SC 89 92 0 96.5% 12.1% ga1 159.0 1314 GA SC
NC 123 126 0 97.4% 5.5% sc1 70.1 1275 SC NC
VA 153 156 0 97.9% 4.9% nc1 -53.0 1088 NC VA
MD 105 108 573 97.0% 14.4% va1 -205.8 1433 VA MD
TN 127 130 0 97.5% 100.0% md1 262.0 262 MD PA
KY 124 127 0 97.4% 46.3% tn1 2526.5 5455 TN KY
IL 534 538 0 99.4% 65.4% ky1 518.0 792 KY IL
IN 293 296 0 98.9% 42.7% ky2 412.6 966 KY IN
OH 460 464 0 99.3% 100.0% ky3 1178.0 1178 KY OH
WV 65 69 0 95.3% 24.6% ky4 294.4 1195 KY WV
PA 388 391 0 99.2% 0.8% il1 -16.4 2099 IL IN
NY 614 617 0 99.5% 5.2% in1 103.3 1975 IN OH
NJ 347 350 0 99.1% 100.0% oh1 830.0 830 OH PA
MA 167 209 330 79.7% 100.0% oh2 -9.0 9 OH WV
CT 88 91 0 96.4% 12.1% wv1 220.0 1811 WV PA
RI 38 41 0 92.0% 54.1% pa1 1338.7 2474 PA NJ
NH 0 34 0 0.0% 100.0% pa2 -415.0 415 PA NY
ME 0 41 0 0.0% 53.3% ny1 394.8 740 NY CT
SUM 7,632 7,815 7,632 ny2 -432.1 576 NY MA
nj1 991.8 1380 NJ NY
Ideal Flow Efficiency= 97.7% ct1 306.6 439 CT RI
Actual Flow Efficiency= 97.7% ri1 269.0 269 RI MA
nh1 0.0 330 NH MA
me1 0.0 500 ME NH
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as those linking North and South Carolina (sc1) and Georgia (ga1), the direction of flow 
is even reversed.  
 











Capacity from to 
TX 1,946 2,202 2,315 88.4% 28.2% tx1 368.8 1310 TX LA
LA 720 720 1,719 100.0% 23.3% la1 1367.5 5873 LA MS
MS 159 159 0 100.0% 3.3% ms1 -187.9 5631 MS AL
AL 218 218 0 100.0% 32.8% ms2 1396.7 4258 MS TN
FL 413 413 0 100.0% 28.6% al1 412.7 1442 AL FL
GA 221 221 694 100.0% 30.9% al2 -818.8 2648 AL GA
SC 92 92 0 100.0% 26.3% ga1 -346.0 1314 GA SC
NC 126 126 0 100.0% 34.4% sc1 -438.1 1275 SC NC
VA 156 156 0 100.0% 51.9% nc1 -564.5 1088 NC VA
MD 108 108 1,091 100.0% 50.3% va1 -720.5 1433 VA MD
TN 130 130 0 100.0% 100.0% md1 262.0 262 MD PA
KY 127 127 0 100.0% 23.2% tn1 1266.8 5455 TN KY
IL 538 538 0 100.0% 65.8% ky1 521.2 792 KY IL
IN 296 296 0 100.0% 43.4% ky2 419.1 966 KY IN
OH 464 464 0 100.0% 100.0% ky3 1178.0 1178 KY OH
WV 69 69 0 100.0% 81.9% ky4 -978.3 1195 KY WV
PA 391 391 0 100.0% 0.8% il1 -16.4 2099 IL IN
NY 617 617 331 100.0% 5.4% in1 106.5 1975 IN OH
NJ 350 350 397 100.0% 100.0% oh1 830.0 830 OH PA
MA 209 209 607 100.0% 100.0% oh2 -9.0 9 OH WV
CT 91 91 0 100.0% 58.3% wv1 -1056.0 1811 WV PA
RI 41 41 0 100.0% 2.4% pa1 59.5 2474 PA NJ
NH 34 34 0 100.0% 100.0% pa2 -415.0 415 PA NY
ME 41 41 405 100.0% 2.6% ny1 -19.1 740 NY CT
SUM 7,559 7,815 7,559 ny2 -576.0 576 NY MA
nj1 106.3 1380 NJ NY
Ideal Flow Efficiency= 96.7% ct1 -110.5 439 CT RI
Actual Flow Efficiency= 96.7% ri1 -151.3 269 RI MA
nh1 329.8 330 NH MA
me1 364.2 500 ME NH  
 
Figure 20.   Optimal Flow for Dispersed Network 
 
The bar charts in Figures 22 and 23 show the natural gas demand and supply for 
each state, as well as the quantity imported, for the Concentrated and Dispersed 
Networks.  As intended, the imported gas is more distributed in the Dispersed Network.  
However, it is interesting to note the demand in Texas is 170% greater than Louisiana, 




















Figure 21.   Natural Gas Supply, Demand and Imports for each node in the “Intact” 
Concentrated Network, demonstrating the centralization of imports in Texas 























To determine the resiliency of each network, its ability to continue functioning 
after sustaining an attack or being impaired by natural causes, such as hurricanes, must be 
assessed.  Damage to state nodes and interstate pipeline links is simulated by setting the 
flow in a given node or link to zero and reevaluating the network’s flow efficiency.  Each 
damage scenario was individually evaluated for each network.  The results are presented 
in Figures 23 and 24. 
Unlike the hub analyses, the results of the damage analyses are different for the 
Concentrated and Dispersed Networks.  Damage to nodes and links located along the 
Gulf coast has a much greater impact on the Concentrated Network.  
If links connecting Louisiana to Mississippi (la1), Mississippi to Tennessee (ms2), 
or Tennessee to Kentucky (tn1) are severed, flow in the Concentrated Network is reduced 
as much as 35%, which exceeds losses in the Dispersed Network by almost 150%.  The 
differences in their ability to continue operating with damage to the link between Texas 
and Louisiana (tx1) is even more dramatic.  The impact of damage to this artery in the 
Concentrated Network is more than ten times worse than it is in the Dispersed Network.   
Of all the nodes and links, loss of the node representing Texas has the greatest 
impact on each network.  In the Concentrated Network, network flow is reduced 46% if 
supply from Texas is suspended.  Though still significant, only 30% of flow is lost in the 
Dispersed Network when subjected to the same damage.   
The advantage of having redundant links in the network is illustrated by the 
absence of any impact on the flow in either network when the links connecting Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia are damaged.  As shown in Figure 23, 
there is no reduction in either network’s flow when the individual links between these 
nodes (il1, in1, oh1, and oh2) are lost, because each is connected to more than one node 











































































Concentrated Network Dispersed Network  
Figure 23.   Percentage of network flow lost as a result of damage to individual 
network components. 
 
Figure 24 compares the damage flow in the Dispersed Network to the damage 
flow in the Concentrated Network and illustrates the improvements in resiliency achieved 
by dispersing the LNG import terminals.  For example, if both networks sustain damage 
to the link connecting Louisiana and Mississippi (la1), flow in the Dispersed Network is 
32% greater than flow in the Concentrated Network.  As expected, the Dispersed 
Network is much more resilient to damage along the Gulf coast.  
Though the Concentrated Network is less impacted than the Dispersed Network 
for several damage scenarios, as illustrated by a “negative” improvement in figure 24, the 









































































































Figure 24.   Comparison of damage flow in Dispersed and Concentrated Networks 
illustrates improved resiliency resulting from dispersal of LNG import terminals.  
 
In addition, if all natural gas flow in the network were considered in lieu of only 
flow supplied by LNG imports the impact of damage on the Concentrated Network 
would be even more severe.  The vast majority of all natural gas flows north from Texas 
and Louisiana, as discussed in Chapter II and illustrated in Figure 6, but only the flow 
from LNG import terminals located in the Gulf region is considered.  
 
D. RESULTS SUMMARY 
The Total, Concentrated and Dispersed Networks are all “scale-free.”  They each 
have valuable hubs that could be deliberately targeted and exploited.  In the Concentrated 
Network, Texas and Louisiana are the most connected nodes, each with a degree of 
seven.  Links in the Dispersed Network are less concentrated.  Louisiana, Kentucky, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts each have a degree of six.   
The Concentrated and Dispersed Networks perform similarly in the intact, 
undamaged condition.  The hub analyses determined the risk and vulnerability of each 
network.  Because the elimination costs were assumed to be equal for all links and nodes 
in both networks, and the majority of the nodes and links in each have the same 
characteristics, the risk and vulnerability of the Concentrated Network are comparable to 
the risk and vulnerability of the Dispersed Network.  Though the optimal budget 
allocation strategy necessary to minimize risk in each network is different, a given 
investment will produce similar results in both networks.  The return on investment is 
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non-linear and 80% of the network risk can be eliminated by strategically investing 20% 
of the assumed elimination costs.   
Despite the similarities in the intact condition, the networks respond differently to 
damage.  The Dispersed Network is more resilient.  When individual supply nodes or 
links are lost, flow in the Dispersed Network is as much as 33% greater than flow in the 
Concentrated Network.  In particular, the Dispersed Network is much less affected by 
natural disasters and deliberate attacks in the Gulf coast region, providing at least 25% 
more flow when subjected to the same damage.  Although flow in the Dispersed Network 
is more impacted than it is in the Concentrated Network for eighteen damage scenarios, 
the difference in flow between the networks is less than 5% for more than half of these 
scenarios.  At most, Dispersed Network flow is only 8% less than it is in the 
Concentrated Network and in this particular damage scenario, which includes damage to 
the link between Alabama and Georgia (al2), the Dispersed Network is still able to 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Network theory can be used to model the nation’s natural gas supply and 
distribution system and forecast how any given additional terminal will impact the 
risk, vulnerability, and resiliency of this critical infrastructure.    
Existing LNG import terminals, natural gas storage locations, interstate pipelines, 
and each state’s demands were modeled for the majority of the U.S.  The physical 
location and capacity of several of the proposed LNG import terminals currently under 
review by state and federal officials were added to the model of the existing 
infrastructure.  The relative risk, vulnerability, and resiliency of different possible 
network configurations were determined using the assessment capabilities in Network 
Analysis 4.0 and a flow optimization routine solved with Microsoft Office Excel 2003.    
2. The impact of concentrating new LNG import terminals in one 
geographic region can be predicted.   
Choosing from several proposed LNG import terminals currently under review by 
federal authorities or approved but not yet constructed, two possible network 
configurations were conceived, each with eight new LNG import terminals.  One 
configuration geographically concentrated all of the new LNG import terminals in the 
Gulf states, while the other had only three new terminals in the Gulf and dispersed five of 
the terminals along the East coast.  Each network was modeled and compared.  The 
results of the hub and damage analyses demonstrate the natural gas supply and 
distribution network is more resilient and tolerant to damage if the LNG import terminals 
are dispersed.  Concentrating the LNG import terminals along the Gulf coast exacerbated 
the impact of natural disasters and deliberate attacks in the Gulf region.   
Selection of LNG import terminals for the networks assessed in this study was 
limited to those terminals currently proposed or already approved.  However, given 
additional flexibility over the location and size of import terminals, the resiliency of the 
nation’s natural gas supply and distribution network could be optimized further. 
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3. Network theory provides valuable insight that should be considered 
during the siting process for new LNG import terminals.   
Many communities have significant concerns and local opposition can 
successfully derail attempts to site new LNG facilities.  Network analysis will not allay 
the public’s fear or persuade people to accept a LNG terminal in their “backyard.”  
However, modeling the LNG import terminals, storage facilities, and pipelines as an 
integrated network and understanding its behavior will promote more informed decisions 
by industry, state, and federal officials. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The FERC and USCG should develop a complete network model of the 
nation’s natural gas supply and distribution network.  
Using reliable modeling and more sophisticated flow simulation tools, a detailed 
model of the entire natural gas supply and distribution infrastructure should be 
developed.  The model and analysis methodology should determine the resiliency of the 
existing network and facilitate reassessment of the network with proposed LNG import 
terminals.   
Like other critical infrastructures, the natural gas supply and distribution network 
is so extensive that it is not reasonable to protect all of it.  A firm understanding of how 
this critical infrastructure behaves as a network and responds to potential changes will 
promote sound decisions by government officials. 
Development of individual network models by the FERC and the USCG is 
discouraged.  Interagency cooperation is necessary to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
effort.  In addition, shared expertise will facilitate development and maintenance of an 
optimum network model.  The existing Interagency Agreement between the agencies 
supports this partnership.92  
                                                 
92 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Interagency Agreement Among the FERC, USCG and 
RSPA for the Safety and Security Review of Waterfront Import/Export LNG Facilities,” 
<http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/2004-interagency.asp> (Accessed 16 October 2006). 
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2. The criteria applied by federal officials during the siting review and 
licensing process should consider the impact a proposed facility will have on the 
nation’s natural gas supply and distribution network.   
The selection of new terminal locations is an important strategic decision that 
should be in alignment with national goals and initiatives.  The addition of critical 
infrastructure must promote development of a network that is inherently robust, reliable, 
and resilient.  The location of LNG import terminals impacts the health and security of 
the entire natural gas supply and distribution network and the ability of this critical 
infrastructure to meet the nation’s increasing demand for natural gas.  The disadvantages 
of geographically concentrating this critical infrastructure must be understood.  Network 
theory can be used to compare alternative locations and inform decisions long before 
approvals are granted and significant resources are invested. 
In the absence of a national strategic approach, the natural gas supply and 
distribution network will likely evolve in a manner that diminishes its resiliency and 
increases both the vulnerability and the consequences of natural failures and potential 
attacks.  The federal government must use its authority to regulate interstate trade of 
natural gas to ensure proposals for development of additional infrastructure do not 
diminish the resiliency of the nation’s natural gas supply and distribution network.  
Local, regional and national risks and benefits should be considered during the siting 
process.  As part of this evaluation, the FERC and USCG must assess the impact of each 
proposed shore-side LNG import terminal and LNG deepwater facility on the existing 
network.  Approval should only be granted for those import terminals that will improve 
the resiliency of the nation’s natural gas supply and distribution system.   
3. The FERC and USCG should take a more active role in the siting process 
and provide incentives to encourage new LNG import terminals in locations that 
significantly improve the resiliency of the nation’s natural gas supply and 
distribution network.  
The current siting process used by federal agencies to evaluate proposed locations 
is in dire need of improvement.  It fails to effectively bring all parties together and 
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determine the optimal solution for the present and future needs of the local community, 
state, greater region, and nation.   
Local communities faced with the possibility of having LNG import terminals 
built in their backyards have difficult decisions to make.  They are often confused by 
conflicting facts and opinions produced by the “experts.”  The public’s fear creates 
tension and fuels emotional debates over the risk associated with LNG import terminals, 
which only serves to further polarize opposing parties.  The stiff opposition in many 
communities may force the natural gas industry to continually concentrate new 
infrastructure along the Gulf coast in spite of the projections for demand, existing supply 
options, and pipeline capacity limitations and “backfill” opportunities.   
This problem is not likely to be resolved on its own without some type of 
intervention.  Unless changes are made, the result will likely be the steady emergence of 
increased vulnerabilities that require costly protection measures and degrade the 
resiliency of the network, with grave implications for U.S. economic prosperity and 
national security.   
In lieu of seeking tighter regulatory controls and using strong arm tactics to 
overrule local concerns, the federal government must take a more active role in the siting 
process in those locations where the presence of a LNG import terminal would improve 
the resiliency of the nation’s natural gas supply and distribution network.  The FERC or 
USCG should help industry establish effective communications with all stakeholders, 
understand public concerns, earn social trust, achieve acceptance by the local community, 
and obtain the political support necessary to successfully site LNG import terminals in 
locations that improve network resiliency.   
Economic incentives, tax benefits, grants, and other resources and investments 
should be used, where appropriate and necessary, to address and overcome local 
concerns.  Since it is too costly to protect the entire natural gas supply and distribution 
network, it may be more cost effective to dedicate resources to build a more resilient 
network rather than continue to develop and protect one that is more vulnerable.  Nearly  
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$2 billion in grants have been provided by the DHS to strengthen security of critical 
infrastructure.93  Some of this funding should be dedicated to improving network 
resiliency.  
4. The federal government should immediately consider these 
recommendations.  
The explosive growth in LNG imports has spawned a huge wave of natural gas 
infrastructure development.  The present opportunity to shape and intelligently structure 
the nation’s natural gas supply and distribution system is unprecedented.  After industry 
has built the capacity needed, additional investments of this magnitude are unlikely.  
Such an opportunity rarely presents itself and must not be squandered.  
To provide optimum benefit, these recommendations must be adopted 
immediately and used to evaluate the LNG import terminals currently proposed and 
under review. 
5. The Department of Homeland Security should consider using network 
theory to evaluate other critical infrastructures. 
The principles and theory applied to the natural gas supply and distribution 
network in this study could also be applied to other infrastructures that are interconnected 
and operate as a network, such as the electrical power supply and distribution system.  
The insight provided by the application of network theory could help DHS develop 
priorities and determine funding initiatives related to the protection of critical 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
93 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces $445 Million to Secure Critical 
Infrastructure,” press release, 9 January 2007, 
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